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Abstract	
Cooperative	 banks	 are	 small	 credit	 institutions,	 and	 they	 are	more	 likely	 than	 commercial	
banks	 to	 default	 in	 periods	 of	 financial	 stability.	 Focusing	 on	 Italy	 (one	 of	 the	 largest	
cooperative	banking	markets),	we	analyse	the	contribution	of	efficiency	to	the	estimation	of	
the	 probability	 of	 default	 of	 cooperative	 banks.	 We	 estimate	 several	 measures	 of	 bank	
efficiency,	 and	 we	 run	 a	 discrete‐time	 survival	 model	 to	 determine	 whether	 different	
managerial	 abilities	 play	 different	 roles	 in	 predicting	 bank	 failures.	 We	 show	 that	 higher	
efficiency	 levels	 (both	 in	 cost	 minimization	 and	 revenue	 and	 profit	 maximization)	 have	 a	
positive	and	statistically	significant	link	with	the	probability	of	survival	of	cooperative	banks.	
We	also	find	that	capital	adequacy	reduces	the	probability	of	default,	supporting	the	view	that	
higher	capital	buffers	provide	additional	loss	absorbency	and	reduce	moral	hazard	problems.	
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1 Introduction		
Cooperative	banks	play	a	key	role	in	the	European	banking	industry.	In	2010,	cooperative	
banks	were	 a	 driving	 force	 for	 socially	 committed	 business	 at	 the	 local	 level	 through	 their	
3,900	member	banks,	65,000	branches,	more	than	770,000	employees,	50	million	members,	
and	 180	 million	 clients	 (European	 Association	 of	 Co‐operative	 Banks,	 2011).	 Overall,	
cooperative	 banks	 account	 for	 approximately	 one	 fifth	 of	 the	 European	 banking	 system	
(market	 shares	 of	 deposits	 and	 credits	 are	 21%	 and	 19%,	 respectively).	 Various	 studies	
(Groeneveld	 and	 de	 Vries,	 2009;	 Cihák	 and	 Hesse,	 2007;	 Groeneveld,	 2012)	 suggest	 that	
cooperative	banks	are,	on	average,	more	stable	 than	commercial	banks	because	they	have	a	
great	 deal	 of	 soft	 information	 (which	 is	 hard	 to	 collect)	 on	 the	 creditworthiness	 of	
members/customers,	 and	 therefore	 they	 are	 much	 less	 likely	 to	 make	 lending	 mistakes.	
However,	in	times	of	financial	stability,	regulators	are	more	prone	to	let	a	distressed	bank	go	
into	default	if	it	is	a	small	cooperative	bank.	This	outcome	is	consistent	with	the	Too‐Big‐To‐
Fail	 policy	 (i.e.,	 regulators	 avoid	 letting	 the	 largest	 and	 most	 powerful	 banks	 go	 out	 of	
business	 in	 order	 to	 prevent	 panic	 in	 financial	 markets)	 and	 the	 Too‐Important‐To‐Fail	
argument	 (i.e.,	 regulators	 avoid	 letting	 the	 most	 well‐known	 and	 systematically	 important	
banks	 go	 out	 of	 business	 in	 order	 to	 prevent	 the	 risk	 that	 many	 banks	 fail	 together).	 For	
instance,	the	default	rate	of	Italian	cooperative	banks	was	almost	four	times	higher	than	that	
of	commercial	banks	in	the	period	before	the	financial	crisis	(1997–2006).	Specifically,	there	
were	 44	 default	 cases	 among	 cooperative	 banks	 (default	 rate	 1.04%)	 and	 8	 among	
commercial	banks	(default	rate	0.28%).	
Our	paper	analyses	the	determinants	of	the	probability	of	survival	of	cooperative	banks.	
What	 drives	 the	default	 of	 banks?	 Is	 efficiency	 a	determinant	 in	 the	default	 of	 banks?	Does	
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managerial	skill	play	a	role	in	the	financial	distress	of	small	credit	institutions?		The	purpose	
of	this	paper	is	to	empirically	address	these	questions	in	regard	to	cooperative	banks.	Because	
there	 is	 evidence	 that	higher	 efficiency	 reduces	bank	 risk‐taking	 (e.g.,	Berger	 and	DeYoung,	
1997;	Fiordelisi	et	al.,	2011;	Cihák	and	Schaeck,	2013),	we	posit	that	a	lower	exposure	to	risky	
assets	 increases	 the	 survival	 time	 of	 a	 bank.	 Consequently,	we	 argue	 that	 higher	 efficiency	
favours	bank	soundness.	Surprisingly,	there	is	limited	available	empirical	evidence	supporting	
this	 expectation.	As	 such,	we	posit	 that	bank	 survival	 is	 related	 to	 the	managerial	 ability	 to	
save	 costs	 (cost	 efficiency),	 maximize	 revenues	 (revenue	 efficiency),	 and	 maximize	 profits	
(operating	and	interest	efficiency).		
We	have	three	main	results.	First,	we	show	that	more	efficient	banks	(efficient	either	 in	
cost	saving	or	in	revenue	maximization)	have	a	higher	probability	of	survival.	Second,	we	find	
that	when	a	bank’s	managerial	 ability	 to	minimize	 costs	 and	maximize	 revenues	are	 jointly	
considered	(e.g.,	efficiency	in	generating	interest	income),	more	skilful	management	increases	
the	bank’s	survival	time.	Third,	we	find	evidence	to	support	the	view	that	traditional	financial	
ratios	are	consistent	predictors	of	bank	distress.	In	this	regard,	we	show	that	capital	is	a	key	
determinant	of	bank	soundness.		
We	analyse	a	large	sample	with	more	than	4,200	observations	‐	all	the	Italian	cooperative	
banks	between	1997	and	2009.	We	estimate	the	probability	of	default	by	running	a	discrete‐
time	survival	model	that	relates	a	change	in	the	hazard	rate	to	an	absolute	change	in	a	given	
covariate,	all	else	being	equal.	We	focus	on	Italy	because	this	case	 is	particularly	 interesting	
for	various	reasons.	First,	cooperative	banks	play	a	crucial	role	in	the	Italian	banking	market	‐	
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Italian	 cooperative	 banks1	have	 approximately	 36,000	 employees,	 6.7	 million	 clients,	 1.1	
million	members2,	and	7.3%	of	the	market	share	of	deposits3.	Second,	the	Italian	cooperative	
banking	 sector	 is	 the	 fourth	 largest	 in	Europe	after	Germany,	France,	 and	Austria	 (in	 2010,	
6.7%4	of	the	total	assets	under	management	in	the	EU	27	cooperative	banking	sector).	Finally,	
Italy	presents	 a	useful	 laboratory	 setting	 to	 analyse	 the	 impact	 of	 the	economic,	 social,	 and	
demographic	 conditions	 of	 local	 areas	 on	 bank	 efficiency.	 The	 Italian	 regions	 display	 very	
different	conditions	that	must	be	considered	to	accurately	estimate	the	probability	of	failure.	
The	remainder	of	the	paper	is	organized	as	follows:	Section	2	briefly	reviews	the	relevant	
literature.	 In	 Section	 3,	 we	 formulate	 our	 research	 hypotheses	 and	 describe	 the	 data	
employed	in	the	empirical	analysis.	Section	4	summarizes	the	methodology.	Section	5	reports	
the	 results	 of	 the	 analysis.	 Section	 6	 addresses	 the	 predictive	 accuracy	 of	 the	 model,	 and	
Section	7	concludes	and	offers	final	remarks.	
	
2 Literature	review	
Our	 paper	 joins	 two	 separate	 streams	 of	 the	 economic	 literature.	 The	 first	 stream	
concerns	efficiency	estimation	with	the	aim	of	comparing	cooperative	and	commercial	banks.	
One	 group	 of	 studies	 compares	 cooperative	 and	 commercial	 banks	 by	 estimating,	 first,	 a	
specific	 efficiency	 frontier	 for	 each	 type	of	 bank	 and,	 second,	 a	 common	 frontier	 that	 pools	
together	cooperative	and	commercial	banks.	These	papers	provide	mixed	evidence	about	the	
																																																													
1	Note	that	 Italian	Banche	Popolari	are	not	covered	 in	 the	present	analysis	because,	 in	 terms	of	governance,	 they	more	closely	
resemble	joint‐stock	companies	(Fonteyne,	2007).	
2	Source	of	data:	Italian	Federation	of	Cooperative	Banks	(Federcasse),	estimated	data	at	31/12/2011.		
3	Source	of	data:	European	Association	of	Co‐operative	Banks	(2011).	
4	Source	of	data:	own	calculation	using	data	from	the	European	Association	of	Cooperative	Banks	(2011).	Cooperative	networks,	
such	as	the	Dutch	Rabobank	and	the	French	Crédit	Agricole,	are	not	considered	in	the	calculation.		
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cost	and	profit	efficiency	of	such	banks.	Battaglia	et	al.	(2010)	show	that	sample	heterogeneity	
also	 occurs	 when	 estimates	 are	 obtained	 from	 a	 single	 efficient	 frontier	 estimated	 for	
cooperative	banks	only.	Cooperative	banks	have	a	strong	 link	with	 the	geographical	area	 in	
which	 they	 operate;	 therefore,	 the	 levels	 of	 efficiency	 are	 influenced	 by	 the	 social,	
demographic,	and	economic	conditions	of	that	specific	area.		
Various	 papers	 also	 compare	 commercial	 and	 cooperative	 banks	 by	 focusing	 on	 issues	
other	 than	 efficiency.	 Cihák	 and	 Hesse	 (2007)	 use	 individual	 bank	 data	 to	 test	 whether	
cooperative	banks	reduce	the	stability	of	other	banks	and	respond	slowly	to	financial	distress.	
Contrary	to	the	findings	of	previous	studies	(Brunner	et	al.,	2004;	Goodhart,	2004;	Fonteyne,	
2007),	Cihák	and	Hesse	find	cooperative	banks	to	be	more	stable	than	commercial	banks:	the	
lower	volatility	of	 the	cooperative	banks’	 returns	more	 than	offsets	 their	 lower	profitability	
and	capitalization.	Groeneveld	(2012)	compares	commercial	and	cooperative	banks,	focusing	
on	the	mean	values	of	some	indicators	(return	on	equity,	Tier	1	capital,	and	Z‐score).	Overall,	
the	 author	 concludes	 that	 in	 Europe	 cooperative	 banks	 are	 less	 profitable	 and	more	 stable	
than	commercial	banks.		
The	 second	 stream	 of	 literature	 addresses	 the	 estimation	 of	 bank	 failures	 and	 is	
characterized	by	two	approaches:	micro‐	and	macro‐approaches.	The	“micro”	strand	focuses	
on	 individual	 banks’	 balance	 sheet	 data,	 possibly	 integrated	 with	 financial	 market	 data,	 to	
predict	 bank	 failures.	 This	 approach	 stems	 from	 the	 seminal	 papers	 of	 Altman	 (1968)	 and	
Beaver	(1966),	who	use	accounting	data	to	discriminate	between	sound	and	troubled	 firms.	
Since	then,	many	studies	have	assessed	 the	ability	of	 financial	 ratios	 to	predict	 the	 financial	
health	 of	 bank	 operations	 (see,	 among	many	 others,	 Meyer	 and	 Pifer,	 1970;	 Sinkey,	 1975;	
Santomero	and	Visno,	1977;	West,	1985;	Estrella	et	al.,	2000).	Various	papers	have	also	tested	
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the	superiority	of	one	specific	assessment	technique	over	another	(Martin,	1977;	Espahbodi,	
1991;	Shumway,	2001;	Glennon	et	al.,	2002;	Boyacioglu	et	al.,	2009).	Recently,	Demyanyk	and	
Hasan	 (2010)	 reviewed	 this	 extensive	 literature	 and	 showed	 that	 the	 combination	 of	
operational	 research	 techniques	 with	 statistical	 methods	 substantially	 improves	 the	
prediction	of	bank	failures.	Other	recent	works	have	focused	on	the	subprime	mortgage	crisis	
and	the	subsequent	banking	failures	(Davis	and	Karim,	2008a;	Jin	et	al.,	2011;	Cole	and	White,	
2012).	
The	 “macro”	 approach	 investigates	 banking	 crises	 by	 focusing	 on	 macroeconomic	
determinants	(Demirguc‐Kunt	and	Detragiache,	1998;	González‐Hermosillo,	1999;	Davis	and	
Karim,	2008b).	These	studies	typically	analyse	a	large	sample	of	countries	to	determine	which	
macroeconomic	 factors	 signal	a	banking	crisis	 in	advance.	For	 instance,	Demirguc‐Kunt	and	
Detragiache	 (1998)	 argue	 that	 GDP	 growth,	 excessively	 high	 real	 interest	 rates,	 and	 high	
inflation	significantly	increase	the	likelihood	of	systemic	banking	crises.	Other	recent	studies	
(DeYoung,	2003;	Arena,	2008;	Männasoo	and	Mayes,	2009;	Mare,	2012)	have	used	both	the	
micro	 and	macro	perspectives,	 highlighting	 that	 combining	different	 sources	of	 information	
increases	the	accuracy	of	predictions	of	bank	financial	distress.		
Various	papers	have	estimated	the	probability	of	bank	failure	or	survival.	Lane	et	al.	(1986)	
pioneered	 the	 field	 by	 using	 duration	 analysis.	 The	 authors	 were	 the	 first	 to	 use	 the	 Cox	
proportional	 hazards	 model	 to	 predict	 US	 commercial	 bank	 failures.	 Estrella	 et	 al.	 (2000)	
estimate	 the	 likelihood	 of	 failure	 using	 cross‐sectional	 logit	 regressions	 and	 then	 analyse	
time‐dependency	 in	 the	 conditional	 probability	 of	 failure	 through	 a	 proportional	 hazards	
model.	 Wheelock	 and	 Wilson	 (2000)	 use	 a	 competing‐risks	 hazard	 model	 to	 identify	
characteristics	leading	to	either	failure	or	acquisition.	The	authors	demonstrate	that	US	banks	
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that	have	low	capitalization,	high	leverage,	low	liquidity,	poor‐quality	loan	portfolios	and	low	
earnings	are	more	prone	to	failure.	Moreover,	the	authors	suggest	that	inefficiency,	measured	
through	management	quality,	increases	the	likelihood	of	bank	failure.		
Shumway	 (2001)	 develops	 a	 discrete‐time	 hazard	 model	 to	 determine	 probability	
estimates	 for	 corporations	at	each	point	 in	 time.	The	author	argues	 that	hazard	models	 are	
theoretically	preferable	to	single‐period	classification	models	(static	models)	because	hazard	
models	consider	that	firms	change	over	and	through	time.	Hence,	the	resultant	probabilities	of	
default	consistently	approximate	the	true	probabilities	of	failure.	Arena	(2008)	performs	both	
cross‐sectional	 logit	 estimation	 and	 survival	 time	 analysis	 to	 prove	 that	 bank‐level	
fundamentals,	 the	 banking	 system,	 and	 macroeconomic	 variables	 significantly	 affect	 the	
likelihood	 of	 bank	 failures	 in	 the	 case	 of	 banking	 crises	 in	 East	 Asia	 and	 Latin	 America.	 In	
addition,	the	author	suggests	that	systemic	macroeconomic	and	liquidity	shocks	destabilized	
not	only	the	banks	that	were	already	weak	before	the	crises,	but	also	those	banks	that	were	
relatively	 stronger	 ex‐ante.	 This	 result	 suggests	 that	 negative	 effects	 triggered	 by	 systemic	
crises	can	also	affect	sound	banks.	Männasoo	and	Mayes	(2009)	use	a	discrete	complementary	
log‐log	 model	 to	 link	 banks’	 hazard	 rates	 to	 macroeconomic,	 structural,	 and	 bank‐specific	
factors.	The	study	suggests	that	changes	 in	bank	earnings,	efficiency	(measured	by	the	cost‐
income	ratio),	and	the	relative	size	of	the	credit	portfolio	are	not	early	warning	indicators.		
Although	 various	 studies	 (e.g.,	 Berger	 and	DeYoung,	 1997;	 Fiordelisi	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 Cihák	
and	Schaeck,	2013)	have	analysed	 the	relationship	between	bank	efficiency	and	risk‐taking,	
no	studies	have	directly	related	different	managerial	skills	to	the	occurrence	of	bank	failure.	
This	 is	 surprising	 because	 efficiency	 is	 one	 of	 the	 key	 factors	 behind	 bank	 performance	
(Fiordelisi,	2007;	Fiordelisi	and	Molyneux,	2010)	and	it	guarantees	bank	survival	over	time.	
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The	 recent	 crises	 of	 credit	 institutions	 have	 shown	 the	 importance	 of	 assessing	 how	 well	
management	contributes	to	bank	survival	(in	terms	of	minimizing	costs,	maximizing	revenues,	
or	 maximizing	 various	 measures	 of	 profits).	 The	 accurate	 prediction	 of	 bank	 survival	 is	
fundamental	for	practitioners,	investors,	academics,	and	regulators.	Whilst	this	is	true	for	all	
banks,	 it	 is	 critical	 for	 cooperative	 banks	 because	 their	 failure	 has	 been	 historically	 more	
likely	than	that	of	commercial	banks	and	might	generate	higher	social	costs	at	the	local	level.	
	
3 Research	hypotheses	and	data	
In	this	section,	we	formulate	our	research	hypotheses,	and	then	we	outline	the	data	used	for	
the	estimation.	The	key	question	addressed	in	the	paper	is	to	verify	whether	the	managerial	
ability	 of	 a	 bank	 to	 reduce	 costs	 and/or	 increase	 revenues	 plays	 a	 role	 in	 avoiding	 bank	
default.	 Our	 approach	 entails	 an	 empirical	 analysis	 of	 the	 link	 between	 various	 efficiency	
measures	 and	 the	 probability	 of	 default	 of	 cooperative	 banks.	 Moreover,	 we	 estimate	 four	
different	 efficiency	measures	 using	 stochastic	 frontier	 analysis	 and	 test	 our	 results	 using	 a	
balance‐sheet	 measure	 of	 operating	 efficiency	 (i.e.,	 cost‐income	 ratio,	 as	 in	 Männasoo	 and	
Mayes,	2009).	We	specify	three	hypotheses	that	focus	on	various	efficiency	concepts.	
First,	we	posit	that	 if	a	bank	is	more	cost	efficient	than	its	competitors,	 it	 is	 less	likely	to	
default.	The	underlying	assumption	is	that	if	bank	managers	have	superior	skills	in	managing	
costs	and	inducing	higher	cost	efficiency,	this	will	help	the	bank	survive	during	individual	or	
sector	 distress.	 We	 call	 this	 assumption	 “cost‐management	 excellence”.	 A	 competing	
hypothesis	 is	“cost‐skimping”	(originally	posited	by	Berger	and	DeYoung,	1997,	and	recently	
tested	by	Fiordelisi	et	al.,	2011):	if	a	bank	is	more	cost	efficient	than	its	competitors,	there	is	a	
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higher	 likelihood	of	default.	The	underlying	 idea	 is	 that	cost‐efficient	banks	probably	devote	
fewer	resources	to	credit	screening	and	monitoring,	which	implies	a	trade‐off	between	short‐
term	cost	efficiency	and	future	risk‐taking.		
	
Hypothesis	I	(H1):	if	a	bank	is	more	cost	efficient	than	its	competitors,	it	has	a	lower	probability	
of	default	(“cost‐management	excellence”	hypothesis).	
Alternative	Hypothesis	 I	 (H1A):	 if	 a	 bank	 is	more	 cost	 efficient	 than	 its	 competitors,	 it	 has	 an	
increased	probability	of	default	(“cost‐skimping”	hypothesis).	
	
Second,	we	 argue	 that	 if	 a	 bank	 is	more	 revenue	 efficient	 than	 its	 competitors,	 it	 has	 a	
lower	likelihood	of	default.	The	underlying	assumption	is	that	if	bank	managers	have	superior	
skills	 in	managing	revenue	and	stimulating	higher	revenue	efficiency,	this	will	help	the	bank	
survive	 in	 cases	 of	 individual	 or	 sector	 distress.	 We	 name	 this	 assumption	 “revenue‐
management	excellence”.	A	competing	hypothesis	 is	 “short‐term	revenue”:	 if	 a	bank	 is	more	
revenue	efficient	than	its	competitors,	it	has	a	higher	likelihood	of	default.	The	underlying	idea	
is	that	revenue‐efficient	banks	probably	have	a	lower	quality	loan	portfolio,	and	customers	are	
therefore	 willing	 to	 pay	 higher	 interest	 rates.	 This	 implies	 a	 trade‐off	 between	 short‐term	
revenue	efficiency	and	future	bank‐soundness.		
	
Hypothesis	 II	 (H2):	 if	 a	 bank	 is	 more	 revenue	 efficient	 than	 its	 competitors,	 it	 has	 a	 lower	
probability	of	default	(“revenue‐management	excellence”	hypothesis).	
Alternative	Hypothesis	II	(H2A):	if	a	bank	is	more	revenue	efficient	than	its	competitors,	it	has	an	
increased	probability	of	default	(“short‐term	revenue”	hypothesis).	
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Third,	we	assume	that	the	probability	of	default	is	not	only	related	to	the	bank’s	ability	to	
manage	either	 its	costs	or	revenues,	but	also	 to	 its	ability	 to	concurrently	manage	costs	and	
revenues	 to	 achieve	 higher	 profits.	 Specifically,	 a	 cost‐efficient	 bank	 could	 be	 disastrous	 at	
managing	 revenue	 or	 the	 reverse.	 We	 posit	 that	 if	 a	 bank	 is	 more	 profit	 efficient	 than	 its	
competitors,	 it	 has	 a	 lower	 likelihood	 of	 default.	 The	 underlying	 assumption	 is	 that	 higher	
profit	efficiency	implies	that	bank	managers	have	superior	skills	 in	managing	both	costs	and	
revenues,	which	will	help	the	bank	survive	in	times	of	individual	or	sector	distress.	We	call	this	
assumption	“management	excellence”.	Similar	to	hypothesis	H2A,	an	alternative	and	competing	
hypothesis	is	that	of	“short‐term	profits”:	if	a	bank	is	more	profit	efficient	than	its	competitors,	
it	will	have	a	higher	 likelihood	of	default	 (due	 to	a	 lower	quality	 loan	portfolio),	 implying	 a	
trade‐off	between	short‐term	profits	and	the	future	soundness	of	the	bank.	We	test	these	two	
competing	assumptions	using	two	different	profit	measures:	operating	profits	(which	includes	
all	operating	costs	and	revenues)	and	the	interest	margin	(which	includes	only	interest	costs	
and	revenues).	
	
Hypothesis	 III	 (H3):	 if	 a	 bank	 is	 more	 profit	 efficient	 than	 its	 competitors,	 it	 has	 a	 lower	
probability	of	default	(“management‐excellence”	hypothesis).	
Alternative	Hypothesis	III	(H3A):	 if	a	bank	is	more	profit	efficient	than	its	competitors,	it	has	an	
increased	probability	of	default	(“short‐term	profits”	hypothesis).	
	
Our	 sample	 comprises	 more	 than	 4,200	 observations	 and	 includes	 the	 financial	
statements	 of	 almost	 all	 the	 Italian	 cooperative	 banks.	 The	 data	 cover	 the	 period	 between	
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1997	and	2009,	although	we	do	not	include	the	years	2007	and	2008	because	they	contain	no	
default	events.	Each	bank	contributes	Tt	rows	of	data,	 corresponding	to	the	number	of	 time	
periods	t	in	which	it	was	at	risk	of	failure.		
The	data	set	 for	 the	explanatory	variables	 is	comprehensive,	 combining	bank‐level	data,	
geographical	 information,	 and	 efficiency	 measures.	 Market	 information	 is	 not	 considered	
because	cooperative	banks	are	not	publicly	traded	and	have	very	little	market	activity.	
We	 collect	 data	 from	 various	 sources.	 Data	 on	 distressed	 banks	 are	 retrieved	 from	 the	
Italian	Central	Bank	(Bank	of	Italy);	accounting	data	are	obtained	from	the	Italian	Association	
of	 Cooperative	Banks	 (Federcasse);	 and	we	 garner	 local	 geographical	 information	 from	 the	
Italian	 National	 Institute	 of	 Statistics	 (ISTAT).	 	 The	 bank‐level	 data,	 a	 potential	 leading	
indicator	 of	 failure,	 are	 drawn	 from	 the	 banks’	 financial	 statements.	 Data	 are	 publicly	
available	 for	most	key	 items	 ‐	 liquidity,	balance	 sheets,	profits	and	 losses,	 off‐balance	 sheet	
items,	 large	 depositors,	 and	 large	 exposures.	 The	major	 constraints	 are	 information	 on	 the	
sector	pattern	of	lending	(including	exposure	to	the	property	sector)	and	the	interest	rates	on	
liabilities	and	assets.	
	
4.	Methodology	
Following	Männasoo	 and	Mayes	 (2009),	 we	 estimate	 a	 discrete‐time	 survival	 model	 to	
determine	the	probability	of	failure	at	each	point	in	time.	We	run	a	two‐stage	analysis.	First,	a	
complementary	 log‐log	 model	 (cloglog)	 is	 estimated	 using	 various	 efficiency	 measures,	
macroeconomic	 information,	 and	 bank	 risk‐taking	 variables.	 Second,	 we	 test	 out‐of‐sample	
the	accuracy	of	the	prediction	of	the	model	and	the	robustness	of	the	results.	
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4.1	The	hazard	model	
We	 estimate	 the	 survival	 model	 in	 discrete	 time	 because	 our	 data	 set	 only	 provides	
observations	discretely.	We	focus	on	a	single‐state	model,	and	we	assume	that	we	have	single‐
spell	data	for	each	bank.	Our	model	 implicitly	assumes	that	all	relevant	differences	between	
banks	 can	 be	 summarized	 by	 the	 observed	 explanatory	 variables.	 We	 also	 assume	 that	
bankruptcy	only	occurs	at	discrete	points	in	time	(t=	1,	2,	3,...,	n).	Moreover,	each	bank	either	
fails	 during	 the	 sample	 period	 or	 survives.	 If	 banks	 merge	 or	 are	 liquidated	 or	 if	 the	
identification	 variable	 (Abi)	 is	 not	 available	 for	 the	 whole	 observation	 window,	 they	 are	
omitted	from	the	sample.	Thus,	we	consider	exits	from	a	single	state	(soundness)	to	a	single	
destination	(failure).		
The	 random	 variable	 T	 denotes	 the	 time	 to	 exit	 from	 the	 sample	 (failure)	 and	 t	 the	
realization	thereof.	The	discrete‐time	duration	model	implies	that	we	observe	the	probability	
of	survival	of	cooperative	banks	at	distinct	points	in	time.	Because	the	sample	data	refer	to	an	
observation	window	of	 ten	years,	 the	survival	 time	data	 set	 is	 right‐censored,	meaning	 that	
we	observe	the	start	date	of	the	spell	(year	1996)	but	not	the	total	length	of	transition	out	of	
the	 current	 state	 (from	soundness	 to	 failure).	 It	 is	 also	assumed	 that	 the	process	 that	 gives	
rise	to	censoring	is	independent	from	the	survival‐time	process.	The	probability	of	exit	within	
the	jth	interval	is	expressed	as	follows:	
		 (	1	)
where	a1,a2,…..,ak	are	the	interval	boundary	dates	(years);	F(aj)	is	the	cumulative	distribution	
function	of	T	at	duration	time	 j	(failure	function);	and	S(aj)	 is	the	survival	function	at	time	 j.	
The	discrete	hazard	rate	is	the	conditional	probability	of	exit	in	the	interval	(aj‐1,	aj]	defined	as:	
1 1 1Pr( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )j j j j j ja T a F a F a S a S a       
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		 (	2	)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	discrete‐time	survivor	function	is	the	product	of	probabilities	of	not	experiencing	the	
event	in	each	of	the	intervals	up	to	and	including	the	current	one.	Written	in	terms	of	interval	
hazard	rates,	it	corresponds	to:	
		
(	3	)	
We	allow	the	hazard	rate	to	vary	between	banks	depending	on	their	characteristics,	and	
we	 summarize	 this	 information	 in	 a	 vector	 of	 variables.	 Time‐varying	 covariates	 offer	 an	
opportunity	to	dynamically	examine	the	relationship	between	the	distress	probability	and	the	
changing	 conditions	under	which	 the	distress	 takes	place.	The	hazard	 rate	 and	 the	 selected	
characteristics	are	linked	through	an	index	function.	Following	Männasoo	and	Mayes	(2009),	
we	employ	a	complementary	log‐log	model	(cloglog):	
( , ) 1 exp[ exp( ' ' ' )]j j j j jh j         X EF CAL ENV 	 (	4	)
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
where	 	contains	 time‐varying	 covariates;	 ,	 ,	 and	 are	 the	 vectors	 of	 coefficients;	
	denotes	 efficiency	 measures;	 jCAL captures	 bank‐level	 fundamentals;	
represents	 environmental	 variables;	 and	 	is	 the	 log	 of	 the	 difference	 between	 the	
integrated	 baseline	 hazard	 evaluated	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 interval	 and	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	
interval	(aj‐1;	aj].	Each	regression	coefficient	summarizes	the	effect	on	the	hazard	of	absolute	
changes	in	the	corresponding	covariates.	The	coefficients	do	not	vary	with	survival	time.	
	
1 1
1
( )
Pr( | ) 1
( )
j
j j j
j
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4.2	Variables	
4.2.1	Event	of	failure	
Following	 previous	 studies	 (Arena,	 2008;	 Männasoo	 and	 Mayes,	 2009,	 among	 others),	
bank	 default	 is	 defined	 as	 the	 occurrence	 of	 public	 intervention	 to	 solve	 a	 critical	 distress	
situation.	We	model	bank	failures	using	a	categorical	variable	that	equals	1	if	bank	i	failed	at	
time	t	and	equals	0	otherwise.	Following	Italian	law,	we	define	a	bank	as	being	in	default	if	it	
underwent	 either	 of	 the	 two	 following	 events	 between	 January	 1,	 1997	 and	 December	 31,	
2006:	 a)	 it	 entered	 extraordinary	 administration	 (e.g.,	 conservatorship),	 or	 b)	 it	 entered	
liquidation.	Each	of	these	government	interventions	objectively	shows	that	a	bank	is	unable	to	
continue	its	operations.		
We	collect	data	on	distressed	banks	from	the	Bank	of	Italy.	Overall,	there	were	44	cases	of	
government	intervention	(either	extraordinary	administrations	or	liquidations)	in	the	period	
analysed,	as	shown	 in	Table	1.	Accounting	data	 for	all	 cooperative	banks	are	obtained	 from	
the	Italian	Federation	of	Cooperative	Banks	(Federcasse).	
	
<	Insert	here	Table	1	>	
	
4.2.2	Explanatory	variables	
The	set	of	potential	explanatory	variables	is	chosen	in	order	to	explain	the	probability	of	
failure	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 better	 management	 of	 bank	 operations	 quantified	 by	 the	
efficiency	measures.		
First,	we	estimate	cost	efficiency	by	using	Battese	and	Coelli’s	(1995)	stochastic	frontier	model,	
as	detailed	 in	Appendix	1.	We	also	 compute	 the	 cost‐to‐income	 ratio	 as	 a	direct	 test	 to	measure	
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efficiency	 in	 generating	 operating	 income.	We	 then	 include	 other	 variables	 that	 are	 likely	 to	
contribute	 to	 the	 survival	 of	 a	 cooperative	 bank.	We	 take	 into	 consideration	 the	 economic	
conditions	of	the	local	area	environment	(measured	by	the	annual	growth	rate	in	Italian	GDP	
per	capita	and	the	employment	growth	in	the	regional	workforce)	because	these	are	likely	to	
affect	the	survival	of	cooperative	banks	(Mare,	2012).	A	second	group	of	variables	focuses	on	
bank‐specific	factors.	We	select	the	indicators	following	the	well‐known	CAMEL	framework5:	
specifically,	 we	 measure	 Capital	 Adequacy	 as	 the	 ratio	 between	 the	 capital	 in	 excess	 of	
regulatory	 requirements	 and	 the	 minimum	 capital	 requirement;	 we	 estimate	 bank	 Asset	
Quality	 using	 the	 ratio	 of	 annual	 loan	 loss	 provisions	 to	 total	 loans	 and	 we	 quantify	 the	
Liquidity	Risk	as	the	ratio	of	bank	deposits	to	customer	deposits.	The	two	remaining	CAMEL	
categories	(i.e.,	Management	Quality	and	Earnings)	are	explicitly	included	in	the	estimation	of	
the	 efficiency	 measures.	 We	 also	 control	 for	 a	 bank’s	 asset	 size	 and	 for	 a	 bank’s	 credit	
orientation.	Table	2	describes	the	variables	employed	in	the	analysis	and	reports	the	expected	
signs	of	the	estimated	parameters.	
	
<	Insert	here	Table	2	>	
	
The	 descriptive	 statistics	 for	 the	 explanatory	 variables	 are	 reported	 in	 Table	 3.	 We	
separate	all	banks	 into	 two	categories:	 failed	and	non‐failed	banks.	T‐tests	are	computed	to	
detect	statistically	significant	differences	in	univariate	comparisons.		
																																																													
5	CAMEL	 is	 the	 acronym	 referring	 to	 the	 following	 five	 factors	 introduced	by	US	 regulators	 in	November	1979:	 “C”	 stands	 for	
Capital	 Adequacy,	 “A”	 for	 Asset	Quality,	 “M”	 for	Management	Quality,	 “E”	 for	 Earnings,	 and	 “L”	 for	 Liquidity.	 In	 1996,	 CAMEL	
evolved	into	CAMELS,	where	“S”	is	the	Sensitivity	to	Market	Risk.	Cooperative	banks	engage	in	very	little	market	activity;	thus,	the	
CAMEL	framework	is	more	appropriate	to	analyze	their	bank	soundness.	
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<	Insert	here	Table	3	>	
	
5.	Results		
We	report	the	results	from	the	hazard	function	in	Table	4.	Following	Männasoo	and	Mayes	
(2009),	 the	 explanatory	variables	 are	 lagged	by	one	year.	 The	discrete‐time	 survival	model	
relates	 a	 change	 in	 the	 hazard	 rate	 due	 to	 an	 absolute	 change	 in	 a	 given	 regressor,	 ceteris	
paribus.	The	characteristics	of	the	economic	environment	(at	both	the	local	and	national	level)	
and	bank‐specific	 indicators	 are	 introduced	 to	 the	 analysis	 to	 control	 for	 factors	 that	 could	
influence	the	link	between	bank	efficiency	and	the	probability	of	default.	The	control	variables	
are	 standardized	 to	make	 it	 easier	 to	 compare	 the	 individual	 contributions	 of	 the	 different	
factors	to	the	survival	of	cooperative	banks.		
	
<	Insert	here	Table	4	>	
	
To	 test	 our	 research	 hypotheses,	 we	 run	 our	 cloglog	 model	 (Equation	 4)	 using	 five	
different	specifications	to	link	efficiency	and	bank	failure	(respectively,	one	for	each	efficiency	
measure	and	one	using	the	cost‐to‐income	ratio).	
Our	 results	 support	 the	 cost‐management	 hypothesis	 (H1):	 we	 find	 that	 higher	 cost	
efficiency	engenders	a	higher	probability	of	survival.	The	estimated	cost‐efficiency	coefficient	
(in	Estimation	1	of	Table	4)	is	negative	and	statistically	significant	at	the	1%	confidence	level.	
As	a	result,	we	can	reject	the	cost‐skimping	hypothesis	(H1A).		
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In	 regard	 to	a	bank’s	 ability	 to	maximize	 its	 revenues,	 our	 results	 support	 the	 revenue‐
management	hypothesis	 (H2),	 suggesting	 that	banks	 that	 are	 able	 to	 extract	more	 revenues	
from	services	provided	to	customers	and	achieve	higher	returns	from	their	investments	have	
a	higher	probability	of	survival.	The	estimated	revenue‐efficiency	coefficient	(in	Estimation	2	
of	Table	4)	is	negative	and	statistically	significant	at	the	10%	confidence	level.	Consequently,	
we	can	reject	the	short‐term	revenue	hypothesis	(H2A).		
Turning	 to	 profits,	 our	 findings	 support	 the	 management‐excellence	 hypothesis	 (H3)	
because	more	profit–efficient	banks	are	found	to	have	a	higher	probability	of	survival.	We	use	
two	 measures	 of	 profitability:	 operating	 income	 and	 interest	 margin.	 In	 both	 cases,	 the	
coefficient	(in	Estimations	3	and	4	of	Table	4)	is	negative	and	statistically	significant	at	the	1%	
confidence	level.	Consequently,	we	can	also	reject	the	short‐term	profits	hypothesis	(H3A).		In	
Estimation	5	in	Table	4,	the	cost‐to‐income	ratio	is	positively	related	to	a	bank’s	risk	of	failure,	
as	 banks	 that	 are	 less	 able	 to	 contain	 their	 operating	 costs	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 poorly	
managed	and	show	a	higher	hazard	rate.	
	We	find	that	 the	CAMEL	indicators	are	statistically	significant	(at	the	10%	level	or	 less)	
and	 strongly	 related	 to	 the	 hazard	 rate.	 Specifically,	 higher	 capital	 levels	 reduce	 the	
probability	 of	 default.	 This	 supports	 the	 view	 that	 higher	 capitalization	 provides	 additional	
loss	absorbency	and	reduces	a	bank’s	moral	hazard	(Lane	et	al.,	1986;	Fiordelisi	et	al.,	2011;	
Haq	and	Heaney,	2012,	among	many	others).	As	such,	strengthening	the	capital	requirement	
in	 the	 cooperative	 banking	 sector,	 as	 proposed	 in	 the	 Basel	 III	 agreement6,	 may	 help	 to	
prevent	bank	distress.	
																																																													
6	The	 Basel	 III	 framework	 comprehends	 a	 set	 of	 documents	 issued	 by	 The	 Basel	 Committee	 on	 Banking	 Supervision	 (first	
publication	in	December	2010).	The	aim	is	to	reduce	the	impact	of	banking	crises	in	the	future.	The	Basel	III	agreement	follows	
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We	also	note	 that	asset	quality	 (measured	by	 the	 loan	 loss	provision	 ratio)	 is	positively	
related	(at	the	1%	level)	to	the	probability	of	default.	As	such,	in	the	case	of	a	decrease	in	asset	
quality	(i.e.,	the	loan	loss	provision	ratio	increases),	the	probability	of	default	for	cooperative	
banks	 increases.	 In	 line	with	Männasoo	and	Mayes	(2009),	we	find	that	the	 liquidity	ratio	 is	
positively	 and	 statistically	 significantly	 related	 to	 the	 probability	 of	 default.	 This	 result	
suggests	 that	 when	 cooperative	 banks	 rely	 too	 heavily	 on	 the	 interbank	 market,	 they	 are	
exposed	 to	 the	 sudden	 freezing	 of	 funds.	 This	 can	 lead	 banks	 to	 default,	 especially	 during	
periods	 of	 systemic	 financial	 distress	 when	 funding	 is	 critical.	 Size	 is	 negatively	 related	 to	
bank	failure,	as	larger	cooperative	banks	have	less	concentrated	portfolios	and	can	diversify	
lending	towards	different	industrial	sectors.	
	
6.	Testing	the	Model’s	Predictive	Ability	
We	test	 the	predictive	accuracy	of	our	model	both	 in‐sample	and	by	using	holdout	data.	
The	analysis	of	the	goodness‐of‐fit	enables	us	to	determine	how	well	the	econometric	model	
fits	 the	 observed	 phenomena7.	 We	 again	 run	 the	 five	 models	 in	 Table	 4	 using	 only	 the	
variables	 that	were	 statistically	 significant	 at	 the	 10%	 level;	 therefore,	we	 do	 not	 consider	
employment	 growth	 in	 our	 computations.	 In	 Model	 5	 of	 Table	 4,	 we	 include	 the	 cost‐to‐
																																																																																																																																																																																									
the	 publication	 of	 the	 first	 accord	 on	 capital	 measurement	 and	 capital	 standards	 (Basel	 I,	 July	 1988)	 and	 a	 second,	 more	
comprehensive	framework	(Basel	II,	June	2004).	
7	As	 a	 further	 test,	 we	 run	 a	 robustness	 check	 by	 comparing	 the	 impact	 of	 efficiency	 on	 the	 probability	 of	 bank	 default	 in	
cooperative	and	commercial	banking.	We	 retrieve	accounting	data	on	 Italian	commercial	banks	 from	 the	Bankscope	database.	
Because	data	on	defaults	for	commercial	banks	are	insufficient	to	estimate	a	model	(8	defaults	over	the	period	1997–2006),	we	
focus	on	2009	 (6	defaults).	 All	 estimated	 coefficients	 for	 efficiency	measures	 in	both	 commercial	 and	 cooperative	banks	 have	
signs	that	are	consistent	with	those	estimated	in	Column	5	of	Table	4.	However,	the	overall	statistical	power	of	the	estimation	is	
poor,	mainly	due	to	the	low	number	of	defaults.	Results	from	this	test	are	available	upon	request.	
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income	ratio	because	it	is	statistically	significant	at	the	10%	level	after	removing	the	liquidity	
variable,	employment	growth,	and	GDP	growth.		
Table	5	reports	the	in‐sample	check	of	the	accuracy	of	the	predictions.	In	Panel	A	of	Table	
5,	 we	 report	 six	 indicators:	 Sensitivity,	 Specificity,	 Overall	 Predictive	 Power,	 ROC	 Area,	
Accuracy	 Ratio,	 and	 Brier	 Score.	 Efficiency	 measures,	 estimated	 through	 the	 stochastic	
frontier	analysis,	increase	the	predictive	accuracy	of	the	model	when	compared	with	Model	5,	
in	which	the	cost‐to‐income	ratio	proxies	for	managerial	ability	to	reduce	costs	(inputs)	and	
to	produce	revenues	(output).	
Sensitivity	 quantifies	 the	 proportion	 of	 banks	 in	 default	 that	 are	 correctly	 identified	 as	
such;	 Specificity	 measures	 the	 proportion	 of	 safe	 banks	 (e.g.,	 sound)	 that	 are	 correctly	
identified.	These	two	indicators	are	closely	related	to	the	concepts	of	Type	I	and	Type	II	errors:	
all	 estimated	 models	 have	 an	 in‐sample	 Sensitivity	 higher	 than	 54%	 (70%,	 if	 we	 do	 not	
consider	 Estimation	5,	which	has	 the	 lowest	performance)	 and	Specificity	higher	 than	75%	
(80%,	 if	we	 omit	 Estimation	 5,	which	 has	 the	 lowest	 performance),	 values	 that	 are	 largely	
superior	 to	 those	 of	 a	 naïve	 model	 (i.e.,	 50%).	 The	 Overall	 Predictive	 Power	 is	 the	 ratio	
between	the	sum	of	all	safe	and	defaulted	banks	accurately	classified	and	the	total	number	of	
banks.	All	estimations	have	in‐sample	Overall	Predictive	Power	higher	than	74%	(80%,	if	we	
omit	 Specification	 5,	which	 has	 the	 lowest	 performance,	 and	 83%	 in	 the	 best	 specification,	
which	 includes	operating	 cost	 efficiency),	 a	 figure	 that	 is	 largely	 superior	 to	 that	 of	 a	naïve	
model	(i.e.,	50%).	
We	 compute	 the	 ROC	Curve,	 which	 measures	 the	 impact	 of	 changes	 in	 the	 probability	
threshold,	i.e.,	the	decision	point	used	by	the	model	for	classification.	The	area	under	the	ROC	
Curve	measures	the	discriminating	ability	of	a	binary	classification	model:	the	larger	this	area,	
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the	higher	 the	 likelihood	that	an	actual	default	 case	will	be	assigned	a	higher	probability	of	
being	 in	 default	 than	 an	 actual	 sound	 case.	 All	 estimations	 have	 an	 in‐sample	 Overall	
Predictive	 Power	 higher	 than	 76%	 (83%	 if	 we	 omit	 Specification	 5,	 which	 has	 the	 lowest	
performance,	 and	 88%	 in	 the	 best	 specification,	 which	 includes	 operating	 cost	 efficiency),	
which	is	largely	superior	to	that	of	a	naïve	model	(i.e.,	50%).	
We	also	compute	the	Brier	Score,	which	evaluates	the	quality	of	the	forecasts	as	follows:	
		 (5)	
where	 	is	 the	estimated	default	probability	of	 the	banks	(from	1	to	n),	and	 is	 the	actual	
outcome	of	 the	event	of	default	 (equal	 to	1	 if	obligor	 i	defaults	and	0	otherwise).	The	Brier	
Score	must	therefore	always	be	between	zero	and	one.	The	closer	the	Brier	Score	is	to	zero,	
the	better	the	forecast	of	default	probabilities.	All	estimated	models	have	an	in‐sample	Brier	
Score	close	to	zero.		
Overall,	 the	 specifications	 (especially	 Specification	 1,	 which	 includes	 cost	 efficiency)	
provide	 sound	 estimates	 in	 line	 with	 (or	 better	 than)	 the	 overall	 performance	 of	 previous	
studies	(Shumway,	2001;	Männasoo	and	Mayes,	2009;	Arena,	2008).		
	
<	Insert	here	Table	5	>	
	
We	 also	 run	 an	 out‐of‐sample	 test	 by	 estimating	 hazard	 rates	 using	 the	 estimated	
coefficients	 and	 data	 from	 2009.	 This	 enables	 us	 to	 validate	 our	 results	 by	 tackling	 the	
problem	of	sample‐specific	estimation.	The	meaning	of	 the	goodness‐of‐fit	 test	 is	 limited,	as	
1
1 ( )
n
i i
i
B p
n


 
ip i
	 
20
we	 observe	 only	 six	 default	 cases	 in	 2009	 (and	 no	 defaults	 in	 2007	 and	 2008).	 Not	
surprisingly,	we	 find	 that	 the	predictive	 accuracy	of	 the	model	 (Table	6)	 is	 lower	 than	 that	
obtained	in‐sample	(Table	5),	but	the	predictive	power	of	our	model	is	still	high.	The	overall	
predictive	power	is	higher	than	74%	for	all	 the	models,	and	the	Brier	Score	continues	to	be	
very	low	(lowest	value	0.014).	
<	Insert	here	Table	6	>	
	
7.	Conclusions	
Our	paper	analyses	the	contribution	of	efficiency	to	the	probability	of	bank	failure	among	
cooperative	 banks.	 Cooperative	 banks	 play	 a	 key	 role	 in	 the	 European	 banking	 industry.	
Despite	 their	 importance,	 these	 banks	 experience	 financial	 distress	 more	 frequently	 than	
commercial	banks	during	periods	of	financial	stability.	The	default	rate	of	Italian	cooperative	
banks	 was	 almost	 four	 times	 that	 of	 commercial	 banks	 in	 the	 period	 before	 the	 recent	
financial	 crisis	 (1997–2006).	 Specifically,	 there	 were	 44	 default	 cases	 among	 cooperative	
banks	(default	rate	1.04%)	and	8	among	commercial	banks	(default	rate	0.28%).		
Our	paper	analyses	the	determinants	of	the	probability	of	survival	of	cooperative	banks	by	
focusing	on	 the	 role	 of	 efficiency.	Our	 results	 indicate	 that	 lower	 risk	 is	 related	 to	 a	 higher	
survival	 time	 for	cooperative	banks.	These	 findings	contribute	 to	 the	existing	 literature	that	
investigates	 the	 direct	 link	 between	 efficiency	 and	 risk‐taking	 (Chortareas	 et	 al.,	 2011;	
Chronopoulos	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 Fiordelisi	 et	 al.,	 2011)	 by	 showing	 that	 prudent	 and	 skilful	
managerial	abilities	increase	the	survival	time	of	cooperative	banks.	To	support	our	view,	we	
test	three	research	hypotheses	that	focus	on	the	contribution	of	efficiency	to	the	probability	of	
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bank	failure.	Namely,	we	posit	that	bank	survival	 is	related	to	the	managerial	ability	to	save	
costs	(H1),	maximize	revenues	(H2),	and	maximize	profits	(H3).		
We	 study	 a	 large	 sample	 of	 Italian	 cooperative	 banks.	 We	 show	 that	 all	 efficiency	
measures	have	lower	hazard	rates,	meaning	that	an	increase	in	these	variables	increases	the	
survival	time	of	banks.	Specifically,	we	find	that	more	efficient	banks	(either	in	terms	of	cost	
saving	or	revenue	and	profit	maximization)	show	a	higher	probability	of	survival,	supporting	
the	cost,	revenue,	and	excellent‐management	hypotheses.	
Our	 findings	 are	 of	 interest	 for	 policy	makers	 and	 supervisors.	 Recent	 developments	 in	
banking	 regulations	 stem	 from	 the	 idea	 that	 efficiency	 is	 a	 key	 element	 in	 assessing	 the	
relationship	 between	 bank	 risk	 and	 capital	 levels.	 There	 is	 a	 parallel	 between	 Basel	 II	
prescriptions	 regarding	 internal	 control	 processes	 and	higher	 efficiency	 gains	 because	both	
contribute	to	an	increase	in	the	resilience	of	banks.	Similarly,	the	new	corporate	governance	
directives	for	banks	support	the	cost,	revenue,	and	excellent‐management	hypotheses,	in	line	
with	 the	 results	 of	 the	 paper.	 Moreover,	 we	 show	 that	 higher	 capital	 levels	 reduce	 the	
probability	of	default:	this	supports	the	view	that	higher	capital	levels	provide	additional	loss	
absorbency	 and	 reduce	 a	 bank’s	moral	 hazard.	 As	 such,	 in	 the	 cooperative	 banking	 sector,	
strengthening	 the	 capital	 requirement	 as	 proposed	 in	 the	 Basel	 III	 agreement	may	 help	 to	
prevent	bank	distress.		
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Appendix	1	
Efficiency	measures	estimation	
	
The	 set	 of	 potential	 explanatory	 variables	 is	 chosen	 in	 order	 to	 explain	 the	
probability	 of	 failure	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 better	 management	 of	 bank	 operations	
quantified	by	the	efficiency	measures.	Cost	efficiency	is	measured	using	stochastic	frontier	
analysis	 and	 the	 Battese	 and	 Coelli	 (1995)	 stochastic	 frontier	model.	We	 use	 the	 following	
translog	functional	form:	
	 (6)	
where	 TC	 is	 the	 logarithm	 of	 the	 total	 production	 cost;	 yi	 (i=1,	 2,	 3,	 4)	 are	 output	
quantities;	 Pj	 (j=1,	 2,	 3)	 are	 input	 prices;	 ln	 E	 is	 the	 natural	 logarithm	 of	 total	 equity	
capital;	and	T	is	the	time	trend	to	account	for	possible	changes	in	technology	during	the	
observed	 period.	 In	 order	 to	 guarantee	 linear	 homogeneity	 in	 factor	 prices,	 it	 is	
necessary	(and	sufficient)	to	apply	the	following	restrictions:	1)	the	standard	symmetry	
and	2)	linear	restriction	of	the	cost	function.	Following	previous	studies	(Vander	Vennet,	
2002;	Girardone	et	al.,	2004),	we	include	equity	as	a	netput,	specifying	interaction	terms	
with	both	output	quantities	and	input	prices.	
	 Italian	 cooperative	 banks	 constitute	 a	 heterogeneous	 dataset.	 To	 overcome	 this	
problem	 and	 take	 into	 consideration	 local	 market	 conditions,	 we	 adopt	 the	 technical	
inefficiency	effects	model	proposed	by	Battese	and	Coelli	(1995).	Following	Battaglia	et	
LnTC  a0  bi lnYi 
i1
4 c j lnPj 
j1
3 e1 ln E  t1T  12 ijj1
4 lnYij 
i1
4  ij
j1
3 lnPij  e11 ln E ln E  t11T2
i1
3



 ij
j1
3 lnYi lnPj  i lnYi ln E 
i1
4 i lnYiT 
i1
4  j lnPj ln E 
j1
3  j lnPjT
j1
3
i1
4 T ln E
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al.,	(2010),	we	include	a	large	set	of	environmental	variables	(Table	7)	that	are	estimated	
at	the	regional	level8.		
<	Insert	here	Table	7>	
	
To	 obtain	 a	 complete	 view	 of	 the	 performance	 of	 cooperative	 banks,	 we	 also	
estimate	 revenue‐	 and	 profit‐efficiency	 measures,	 which	 specify	 various	 measures	 of	
profits	(respectively,	total	revenue,	and	operating	income	and	interest	margin)	given	the	
level	of	outputs	rather	than	the	output	prices.	The	frontier	definition	is	the	same	as	in	the	
cost	 case,	 except	 for	 the	 dependent	 variable:	 total	 cost	 is	 replaced	 by	 the	 previously	
mentioned	profit	measure.	
	
	
																																																													
8	Our	 frontier	model	 includes	environmental	variables	that	are	estimated	at	 the	regional	 level	 (for	each	of	 the	20	Italian	
country	 regions),	 but	 we	 only	 report	 summary	 statistics	 at	 the	 macro‐geographical‐area	 level.	 Statistics	 at	 the	 more	
detailed	regional	level	are	available	upon	request.	
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Tables	
Table	1.	Number	of	banks	and	historical	default	rates:	cooperative	vs.	commercial	banks	
		 Cooperative	Banks	 Commercial	Banks	
Year	
Number	
of	Banks	
(A)	
Liquidation	
(B)	
Administration		
(C)	
Total	Number	of	
Banks	in	Default	
(D=A+B)	
Default	Rate	
(E=D/A)	
Number	
of	Banks	
(A)	
Liquidation	
(B)	
Administration	
(C)	
Total	Number	of	
Banks	in	Default	
(D=A+B)	
Default	Rate
(E=D/A)	
1997	 405	 1	 3	 4	 0.99%	 291	 ‐	 2	 2	 0.69%	
1998	 404	 1	 5	 6	 1.49%	 299	 ‐	 ‐	 ‐	 0.00%	
1999	 414	 ‐	 4	 4	 0.97%	 288	 1	 1	 2	 0.69%	
2000	 432	 ‐	 5	 5	 1.16%	 284	 ‐	 1	 1	 0.35%	
2001	 436	 ‐	 5	 5	 1.15%	 296	 ‐	 ‐	 ‐	 0.00%	
2002	 436	 ‐	 6	 6	 1.38%	 293	 ‐	 1	 1	 0.34%	
2003	 430	 1	 6	 7	 1.63%	 282	 ‐	 1	 1	 0.35%	
2004	 434	 ‐	 2	 2	 0.46%	 279	 ‐	 1	 1	 0.36%	
2005	 424	 ‐	 4	 4	 0.94%	 279	 ‐	 ‐	 ‐	 0.00%	
2006	 432	 ‐	 1	 1	 0.23%	 283	 ‐	 ‐	 ‐	 0.00%	
Pre‐Crisis	Period	
(1997‐2006)	 4,247	 3	 41	 44	 1.04%	 2,874	 1	 7	 8	 0.28%	
2007	 431	 ‐	 ‐	 0	 0.00%	 234	 ‐	 ‐	 ‐	 0.00%	
2008	 431	 ‐	 ‐	 0	 0.00%	 255	 ‐	 1	 1	 0.39%	
2009	 421	 1	 5	 6	 1.43%	 285	 ‐	 6	 6	 1.75%	
Crisis	Period	
(2007‐2009)	 1,283	 1	 5	 6	 0.47%	 774	 0	 7	 7	 0.90%	
Overall	Period
(1997‐2009)	 5,530	 4	 46	 50	 0.90%	 3,648	 1	 14	 15	 0.41%	
Source:	own	calculations	using	data	from	Federcasse.	For	commercial	banks,	data	were	obtained	from	the	Supervision	Bulletin	of	the	Bank	of	Italy.	Data	were	not	available	for	all	the	active	banks	in	the	period.
Notes:	This	table	presents	the	historical	time	series	of	Italian	banks,	subject	to	temporary	conservatorship	(Administration)	or	closed	(Liquidation)	by	the	Italian	banking	supervisor	(Bank	of	Italy).	Data	are	
presented	separately	for	cooperative	and	commercial	banks.	Cooperative	banks'	default	rate	is	more	than	twice	the	figure	for	commercial	banks	during	the	overall	period	(1997–2009)	and	almost	four	times	
higher	during	the	pre‐crisis	period	(1997–2006).	During	the	2007–2009	financial	turmoil,	this	tendency	was	reversed,	with	the	commercial	default	rate	rising	to	almost	twice	as	high	as	the	failure	rate	for	
cooperative	banks.	
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Table	2.	Variable	definitions	
Variable	 Definition	 Representative	studies	
Cost		 This	is	the	cost	efficiency,	estimated	using	the	method	illustrated	in	Appendix	1.	
Various	studies,	see	a	review	in	
Hughes	and	Mester	(2010)	
Revenue		 This	is	the	revenue	efficiency,	estimated	using	the	method	illustrated	in	Appendix	1.	 Fiordelisi	and	Molyneux	(2010)	
Operating		 This	is	the	profit	efficiency,	estimated	using	the	method	illustrated	in	Appendix	1.	
Various	studies,	see	a	review	in	
Hughes	and	Mester	(2010)	
Interest	 This	is	the	interest	margin	efficiency,	estimated	using	the	method	illustrated	in	Appendix	1.	 	
Cost‐	Income	 This	is	the	ratio	between	operating	expenses	and	operating	income.	
Lane	et	al.	(1986);	Männasoo	and	
Mayes	(2009)	
Capital	Adequacy	 This	is	the	ratio	between	capital	in	excess	of	regulatory	requirements	over	the	minimum	capital	requirements.	 Regulatory	requirements	
Credit	Orientation	 This	is	the	ratio	between	total	loans	and	total	assets.	 Lane	et	al.	(1986);	Männasoo	and	Mayes	(2009)	
Asset	Quality	 This	is	the	ratio	between	loan	loss	provisions	and	total	loans.	
Männasoo	and	Mayes	(2009);	Arena	
(2008)		
Liquidity	 This	is	the	ratio	between	bank	deposits	and	customer	deposits.	 Männasoo	and	Mayes	(2009)	
Size	 This	is	the	natural	logarithm	of	total	assets.	 Cole	and	White	(2012);	Arena	(2008)
Employment	Growth	 This	is	the	regional	workforce	employment	growth	over	a	two‐year	period.	 DeYoung	(2003)	
GDP	Growth	 This	is	the	annual	growth	rate	in	the	Italian	GDP	per	capita	(at	current	prices).	
Arena	(2008);		Sundararajan	et	al.	
(2002)	
Notes:	This	table	reports	the	names	and	definitions	of	the	variables	employed	in	the	estimation.	The	column	“representative	studies”	lists	some	studies	
that	have	used	the	explanatory	variables.	
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Table	3.	Descriptive	statistics	
		 All	 Non‐Failed	 Failed	 T‐test	for	Means	
Variables	 Mean	 S.E.	 Mean	 S.E.	 Mean	 S.E.	 Difference	 t‐statistic
Cost	
Efficiency		 0.630	 0.269	 0.632	 0.269 0.487 0.210	 	 0.144	 3.543***
Revenue	
Efficiency	 0.630	 0.263	 0.629	 0.263 0.702 0.268	 	 ‐0.073	 ‐1.843*
Operating	
Efficiency		 0.611	 0.271	 0.614	 0.269 0.329 0.231	 	 0.284	 6.978***
Interest	
Efficiency	 0.729	 0.242	 0.731	 0.241 0.542 0.230	 	 0.189	 5.172***
Cost‐Income	 0.780	 0.127	 0.779	 0.123 0.900 0.310	 	 ‐0.122	 ‐6.380***
Capital	
Adequacy	 2.631	 2.230	 2.629	 2.223 2.768 2.851	 	 ‐0.139	 ‐0.4107
Credit	
Orientation	 0.642	 0.122	 0.641	 0.122 0.716 0.128	 	 ‐0.075	 ‐4.038***
Asset	
Quality	 0.003	 0.005	 0.003	 0.005 0.010 0.011	 	 ‐0.007	 ‐9.083***
Liquidity	 0.026	 0.045	 0.026	 0.044 0.031 0.059	 	 ‐0.005	 ‐0.779
Size	 11.663	 0.983	 11.675	 0.971 10.490 1.324	 	 1.185	 8.016***
Employment	
Growth	 0.021	 0.020	 ‐	 ‐	 	 ‐	 ‐	 	 ‐	 ‐	
GDP	Growth	 3.877	 1.248	 ‐	 ‐	 ‐	 ‐	 ‐	 ‐	
Notes:	This	table	reports	the	descriptive	statistics	for	the	variables	employed	to	explain	bank	failures	over	the	period	from	1997–2006.	Data	are	presented	
for	all	banks	and	separately	for	surviving	banks	and	defaulted	banks.	In	the	last	two	columns,	we	present	the	difference	in	means	between	the	two	groups	
(Non‐Failed	and	Failed)	and	the	t‐statistic	under	the	hypothesis	of	equality	of	variances	for	the	two	populations.	The	t‐statistic	is	computed	as	the	ratio	of	
the	difference	in	means	to	the	difference	in	standard	errors.	
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Table	4.	Estimation	results	of	the	discrete‐time	hazard	regression	model	in	cooperative	
banking	between	1997	and	2006	
		 Models	
Variables	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	
Cost	 ‐4.34***	 		 		 		 		
(1.017)	 		 		 		
Revenue	 ‐1.643*	 		 		
(0.927)	 		 		
Operating		 		 		 ‐3.559***	 		
		 		 (0.962)	 		
Interest	 		 		 ‐1.959***	
		 		 (0.662)	
Cost‐Income	 		 		 		 0.060	
		 		 		 (0.051)	
Capital	Adequacy	 ‐0.752***	 ‐0.548***	 ‐0.493**	 ‐0.524***	 ‐0.653***	
(0.202)	 (0.203)	 (0.195)	 (0.191)	 (0.225)	
Credit	Orientation	 0.896***	 0.472**	 0.425**	 0.501***	 0.623***	
(0.164)	 (0.207)	 (0.178)	 (0.178)	 (0.166)	
Asset	Quality	 0.453***	 0.583***	 0.489***	 0.497***	 0.544***	
(0.076)	 (0.08)	 (0.077)	 (0.077)	 (0.073)	
Liquidity	 0.322***	 0.254**	 0.357***	 0.323***	 0.249**	
(0.102)	 (0.105)	 (0.095)	 (0.099)	 (0.106)	
Size	 ‐0.678***	 ‐1.082***	 ‐0.728***	 ‐0.85***	 ‐0.949***	
(0.208)	 (0.17)	 (0.167)	 (0.164)	 (0.183)	
Employment	
Growth	 ‐0.311	 9.325	 2.743	 4.064	 6.631	
(8.224)	 (8.59)	 (7.78)	 (7.913)	 (8.398)	
GDP	Growth	 ‐0.484***	 ‐0.531***	 ‐0.451***	 ‐0.534***	 ‐0.738***	
		 (0.098)	 (0.164)	 (0.094)	 (0.103)	 (0.08)	
Observations	 4215	 4215	 4215	 4215	 4215	
Number	of	Failures	 44	 44	 44	 44	 44	
Number	of	Banks	 476	 476	 476	 476	 476	
Notes:	This	table	presents	the	results	of	the	survival	model	estimated	in	discrete	time.	The	five	models	include	the	same	
set	of	variables	apart	from	the	efficiency	measure.	In	Model	(1),	we	include	cost	efficiency;	in	Model	(2)	we	consider	
revenue	efficiency;	Model	(3)	comprises	operating	income	efficiency;	in	Model	(4)	we	evaluate	the	contribution	of	interest	
margin	efficiency;	and	in	Model	(5)	we	consider	the	cost‐to‐income	ratio.	Standard	errors	are	in	parenthesis.	*,	**,	***	
indicate	significance	at	the	10%,	5%,	and	1%	levels,	respectively,	with	robust	standard	errors.		
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Table	5:	Predictive	accuracy:	in‐sample	checks	
Panel	A:	Goodness‐of‐fit	indicators	
Measure	 Models	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
Sensitivity	 0.795	 0.705	 0.773	 0.750	 0.545	
Specificity	 0.833	 0.801	 0.814	 0.813	 0.748	
Overall	
Predictive	 	 0.832	 0.800	 0.813	 0.812	 0.745	
ROC	Area	 0.879	 0.832	 0.866	 0.845	 0.765	
Accuracy	Ratio	 0.757	 0.664	 0.733	 0.689	 0.531	
Brier	Score*	 		 0.947	 0.939	 0.908	 0.926	 1.108	
Source:	own	calculations.	*	Brier	Score	is	multiplied	by	100.	
Notes:	This	table	reports	the	results	of	the	measures	of	predictive	power	of	the	model	in‐
sample.		
	
Panel	B:	Probability	rankings	versus	actual	bankruptcies;	percent*	
Measure	 Models	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
1‐5	 0.068	 0.136	 0.045	 0.114	 0.091	
6	 0.023	 0.000	 0.023	 0.000	 0.114	
7	 0.023	 0.068	 0.023	 0.068	 0.136	
8	 0.091	 0.091	 0.068	 0.068	 0.159	
9	 0.114	 0.091	 0.091	 0.182	 0.136	
10	 		 0.682	 0.614	 0.750	 0.568	 0.364	
Source:	own	calculations.	*	Probability	rankings	versus	actual	bankruptcies;	percent	classified	
out	of	44	possible.	**	Deciles	of	the	distribution	of	the	estimated	hazard	rate.	
Notes:	This	table	reports	the	ranking	of	the	banks	using	the	estimated	hazard	rate.	Notice	that	
the	sum	is	not	necessarily	equal	to	one	due	to	rounding.	
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Table	6:	Predictive	accuracy:	out‐of‐sample	checks		
Panel	A:	Goodness‐of‐fit	indicators	
Measure	 Models	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
Sensitivity	 0.500	 0.167	 0.167	 0.167	 0.000	
Specificity	 0.793	 0.894	 0.878	 0.749	 0.998	
Overall	
Predictive	 	 0.789	 0.884	 0.868	 0.741	 0.984	
ROC	Area	 0.715	 0.657	 0.680	 0.567	 0.626	
Accuracy	Ratio	 0.430	 0.313	 0.359	 0.134	 0.252	
Brier	Score	 		 0.016	 0.015	 0.014	 0.015	 0.014	
Source:	own	calculations.		
Notes:	This	table	reports	the	results	of	the	measures	of	the	predictive	power	of	the	model	out‐
of‐sample.	The	coefficients	estimated	through	the	model	are	multiplied	by	the	values	of	the	
explanatory	variables	in	2008	to	obtain	the	estimated	hazard	rate	for	2009	(see	§4	for	a	
detailed	explanation	of	the	estimation	of	the	discrete‐survival	model).		
	
Panel	B:	Probability	rankings	versus	actual	bankruptcies;	percent*	
Measure	 Models	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
1‐5	 0.167	 0.167	 0.333	 0.500	 0.333	
6	 0.167	 0.333	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	
7	 0.000	 0.167	 0.000	 0.333	 0.167	
8	 0.167	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.333	
9	 0.167	 0.167	 0.500	 0.000	 0.000	
10	 		 0.333	 0.167	 0.167	 0.167	 0.167	
Source:	own	calculations.	*	Probability	rankings	versus	actual	bankruptcies;	percent	classified	
out	of	6	possible.	**	Deciles	of	the	distribution	of	the	estimated	hazard	rate.	
Notes:	This	table	reports	the	ranking	of	the	banks	using	the	estimated	hazard	rate.	Notice	that	
the	sum	is	not	necessarily	equal	to	one	due	to	rounding.	
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Table	7:	Environmental	variables	included	in	the	efficiency	estimation	(mean	values	by	
macro‐geographical	area)	
	 Centre	 North	East	 North	West	 South	 Total	
Z1	 Population	 density	 (number	 of	 inhabitants	 per	
square	kilometre)	(A)	 194.00 132.74 337.80 214.53	 192.17
Z2	Index	 of	 concentration	 in	 the	 territory,	 (percentage	
ratio	 between	 people	 resident	 in	 the	 main	 city	 of	 the	
region	and	those	resident	in	the	towns)	(A)	
64.76 33.22 32.24 33.77	 39.13
Z3	Gross	domestic	product	per	head	(A)	 24.75 27.73 28.81 15.18	 24.20
Z4	Entrepreneurial	liveliness	(ratio	of	the	net	number	of	
incorporations	in	the	Registrar	of	Companies)	(A)	 2.11 1.77 1.79 2.82	 2.10
Z5	 Incidence	 of	 nonperforming	 loans	 (incidence	 of	
precarious	 loans,	 overdue	 bills,	 groundings,	 and	
restructured	 loans	on	 the	 total	amount	of	bank	assets)	
(B)	
7.90 6.50 5.77 16.43	 9.13
Z6	 Number	 of	 cash	 points	 (ATM	 and	 POS)	 owned	 by	
cooperative	banks	over	the	total	existing	in	the	territory	
(B)		
10.23 19.13 6.52 6.05	 12.52
Z7	 Number	 of	 bank	 branches	 owned	 by	 cooperative	
banks	over	the	total	existing	in	the	territory	(B)		 9.66 37.80 8.58 9.12	 21.47
Z8	Number	of	ATM	and	POS	(owned	by	cooperatives	and	
other	banks)	per	1,000	inhabitants	(B)		 18.45 25.51 15.50 8.63	 18.65
Z9	 Number	 of	 branches	 (owned	 by	 cooperatives	 and	
other	banks)	per	1,000	inhabitants	(B)	 0.58 0.85 0.62 0.32	 0.64
Z10	 Index	 of	 firm	 weakness	 (number	 of	 bankruptcies	
declared	per	1,000	firms)	(A)	 2.97 1.75 2.53 2.66	 2.31
Z11	Level	 of	 criminality	(number	 of	 bank	 robberies	 per	
1,000	branches)	(C)		 77.06 41.40 93.44 91.45	 67.52
Z12	 Index	 of	 solidarity	 (number	 of	 blood	 donors	 per	
1,000	inhabitants)	(D)	 0.22 0.35 0.34 0.12	 0.27
(A)	Source	of	data:	ISTAT	(Italian	National	Institute	of	Statistics)	
(B)	Source	of	data:	Statistical	Bulletins	attached	to	the	magazine	Cooperazione	di	Credito	
(C)	Source	of	data:	Ministero	dell’Interno	(Ministry	of	Home	Affairs)	
(D)	Source	of	data:	AVIS	(Italian	Association	of	Blood	Donors)	
	
